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RECENT DECISIONS
ANTITRUST LAW - FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS- EXCLUSrVE
DEALING CONTRACTS HELD UNFAIR METHOD OF COMPETITION
UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT. -
The Federal Trade Commission, proceeding under Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, enjoined a large shoe man-
ufacturer from entering into certain restrictive franchise contracts
with independent retail shoestore operators. The agreements
provided that, in return for certain valuable services, the dealers
would not purchase conflicting lines of shoes from the manu-
facturer's competitors. The Supreme Court, reversing the circuit
court, unanimously held that the Commission, in enjoining use of
these contracts, acted within its powers even though there was
no proof that the agreements amounted to an "outright violation"
of the antitrust laws. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316
(1966).
The Sherman Act, the first legislative attempt to maintain
effective competition, was phrased in broad language which pro-
hibited every contract in restraint of trade.1  It was believed
that detailed language might hinder legitimate enterprises and
that explicit definitions might provide loopholes. It was left for
the courts to decide what types of conduct Congress intended
to prohibit. However, the courts' restrictive interpretation of the
Sherman Act 2 led to the passage, in 1914, of the Clayton Anti-
Trust Act 3 and the Federal Trade Commission Act.' The
Clayton Act prohibits conduct, the effect of which may be to
126 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). "Every contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal. .. 2 Howrey, Utilization By The FTC Of Section 5 Of The Federal Trade
Commission Act As An Antitrust Law, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 161-62
(1960).
338 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964). This statute makes it
"unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to . . . make a . . .
contract for sale of goods . . . for . . . resale within the United States . .. on
the condition, agreement or understanding that the . . . purchaser thereof
shall not use or deal in the goods of a competitor . . . of the . . . seller where
the effect of such . . . condition, agreement or understanding may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce."
438 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1964). Section
5(a) (1) (15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1)) provides that "unfair methods of competi-
tion in commerce ... are declared unlawful.'
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
"substantially lessen competition"; the Federal Trade Commission
Act prohibits "unfair methods of competition." Both acts were
specifically designed to attack trade practices which might restrain
competition before those practices reached the stage of a "Sherman
Act" violation.5
Although aware of the vagueness of the phrase "unfair
methods of competition" as used in Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, Congress indicated its intention to use
that language in order to provide the act with a flexible means
of control over any new forms of monopolistic practices which
might develop. Thus, it was left to the Federal Trade Com-
mission and the courts to ascertain the scope of the phrase.6
The Supreme Court's interpretation of this phrase was con-
sistently restrictive. In FTC v. Gratz,7 the Court, in addition
to limiting the power of the Federal Trade Commission, stated
that the statute was
clearly inapplicable to practices never heretofore regarded as opposed
to good morals because characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or
oppression, or as against public policy because of their dangerous
tendency unduly to hinder competition or create monopoly.8
In this case and two later ones,9 the Commission used section
5 to attack tying arrangements and exclusive dealership contracts.10
In all three cases, the conduct was the type sought to be eliminated
by the Clayton Act even though it did not come strictly within
its terms. Nevertheless, the Court set aside the Commission's
orders "because of the absence of a showing of a potentially
substantial lessening of competition or tendency to monopoly
threatened by the challenged trade practice-the criteria of illegality
5 FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
6 S. RE'. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914).
7253 U.S. 421 (1920). Acting under § 5, the Commission ordered a
manufacturer to cease and desist from tying the sale of cotton ties to the sale
of cotton bagging.
s Id. at 427.
9 FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923) (a publisher's use
of exclusive dealing contracts barring its wholesale distributors from handling
competitive publications was found by the Court to be an agency relationship
rather than one of sale); FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923)
(gasoline supplier provided storage tanks and pumps to its lessees upon the
condition that only Sinclair gasoline be used with the equipment; the Court
held that the written contracts involved did not expressly limit the lessee's
right to use competitive products).
'
0 When by virtue of a contract, the procurement of a desired product
(the tying product) is conditioned upon the purchase of some other product
(the tied product) in which the seller has a financial interest, the resulting
relationship is styled a "contractual tying arrangement." Comment, Antitrust




under the Clayton Act.""' Thus, in effect, the Supreme Court
has held that section 5 was merely another method of attacking
conduct which was prohibited by Section 3 of the Clayton Act.
The Commission's scope of power under section 5 was thereby
limited to conduct which met the anti-competitive standard of the
Clayton Act.
During the 1940's, however, the Court's dicta began to exhibit
a more liberal approach to the scope of section 5, and indicated
that the Commission's power might extend to declaring unfair
any conduct which was contrary to the public policy declared
in the Sherman and Clayton Acts.1 2  This reference to public
policy indicated that the Federal Trade Commission Act could
encompass conduct which, although not specifically within the
terms of the other two acts, had the anti-competitive effect in-
tended to be proscribed by the antitrust legislation. The resulting
indecisiveness as to the exact extent of its authority under section
5 caused the Commission to act cautiously and to prohibit
conduct only upon an "evidentiary and anti-competitive showing
equivalent to that required under the Clayton Act," 13 i.e., a
substantial lessening of competition. This was done even though
the Commission consistently maintained that it had the power
to enjoin tying arrangements under section 5 upon a lesser
evidentiary showing than that required by section 3.
In Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,14 the
Supreme Court attempted to define the standards of illegality
required to support a finding of a tying arrangement in violation
of Section 3 of the Clayton Act (and, therefore, also in violation
of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act). The Court
stated that
when the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for the
'tying' product, or if a substantial volume of commerce in the 'tied'
product is restrained, a tying arrangement violates the narrower stand-
ards expressed in § 3 of the Clayton Act because from either factor
the requisite potential lessening of competition is inferred.' 5
However, in attacking tying arrangements under section 3, there
was the problem of proving that a substantial lessening of
11 Howrey, supra note 2, at 166.
12 See Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457,
463-64 (1940).
13 Howrey, supra note 2, at 173.
14 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
'1 Id. at 608-09. The Court further adhered to the requirement, set down
earlier, that the actions must affect a not "insignificant or insubstantial"
amount of interstate commerce. Id. at 610. See International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
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competition in the tied item had occurred. Since the Supreme
Court required the same showing of substantial restraint in section
5 proceedings, a similar problem arose in attempting to prove
that a tying arrangement was an "unfair method of competition."
To determine whether a substantial anti-competitive effect
existed, two tests were developed. The first test, that of
quantitative substantiality, was enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Standard Oil Co. v. United States.16  The Court found that
section 3 prohibited oil company contracts which required in-
dependent dealers to purchase all of their business requirements
of one or more products from the company. This quantitative
approach was denounced by many authors as being too mechanical
for such a complex area of the law.'7 Such criticism led to
the development by the Court of the second test, that of qualitative
substantiality.' The Court indicated that, under the qualitative
test, the mere dollar amount of competition affected should not
be determinative, but rather, illegality would depend upon whether
the arrangement tended to "substantially foreclose competition
in the relevant . . . market." 19
While the Supreme Court was operating under the quan-
titative standard, the Commission, in instituting proceedings under
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, was utilizing
the qualitative test.20 The qualitative test was particularly suitable
for two reasons: (1) the Commission was made up of expert
personnel who could call upon their experience to study the
conduct attacked and judge its potential effects on the market;
and (2) the wording of section 5 indicated that the Commission
should act before the anti-competitive scheme was fully developed
and, thus, before the full quantitative effects on competition could
be known. However, since the Supreme Court was using the
quantitative test of Standard Oil in its treatment of tying arrange-
ments, the Commission made many strained attempts to reconcile
its decisions under the qualitative test with the Supreme Court
decisions.2 1  Finally, in 1960, the Commission abandoned the
1 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (contracts comprising $58,000,000 or 6.7% of total
oil products sold in a seven state area). "[U]nder this test, if the pro-
ponent shows a sufficient percentage of foreclosure in the tied product,
economic harm has been established. Under a strict application of this test,
the quantity or percentage of the foreclosure is decisive and the Court makes
no further inquiry." 22 WAsH. & LEE L. REv., mepra note 10, at 216.
17 See Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive
Arrangements under the Clayton Act, 1961 Sup. CT. RFv. 267, 275.
:8 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1962).
'9 Id. at 334.
20 See, e.g., Maico Co., 50 F.T.C. 485 (1953).
21 Bok, supra note 17, at 277-80.
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qualitative test and adopted the Standard Oil rule.22  However,
it was at about this time that the Supreme Court acceded to
the critics of Standard Oil and adopted the qualitative standard.23
As a result, the Court and the Commission were still using op-
posing tests to determine the effect of tying arrangements on
competition.
In the principal case, under the terms of "Brown's Franchise
Stores' Program," the independent retailers entering into the
franchise agreements were provided with certain valuable services
such as special group insurance rates, services of Brown's field
representatives and architectural plans. These services were not
made available to non-franchise customers even though they
could purchase Brown's lines of shoes. In return, the retailer
agreed to concentrate his business within Brown Shoe Company
lines and not to handle any conflicting lines of shoes manu-
factured by Brown's competitors. It appeared from the record
that an average of about 75 per cent of the stock of the 766
retail stores in the program was purchased from Brown. In some
individual instances the amount ran as high as 95 per cent. The
result was the elimination of these retailers as markets for manu-
facturers producing competing lines of shoes. This loss was
evidenced by statistics indicating a decrease in the sales of other
manufacturers directly attributable to the franchise agreements.
The Commission examined a prior case involving the same
defendant to find the standard of illegality necessary to declare
the franchise agreements violative of the antitrust laws.24  In
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States 25 (the Merger Case), the Court
had condemned the merger of Brown Shoe Company and a large
chain of retail shoe dealers. This form of "vertical integration" 26
(a vertical merger) had been attacked under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act.2 7  Although the Court had found that the merger
2 Mytinger v. Casselberry, Inc., 1960-61 Trade Reg. Rep. 29,091 (1960)
(final order), aff'd, 301 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1962), overruing Maico Co.,
supra note 20.
23 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., supra note 18.
24 Brown Shoe Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1963 Transfer Binder) 16,316.
25 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
215 Vertical integration has been defined as "that type of organization that
comes into existence when two or more successive stages of production and/or
distribution are combined under the same control." COLE, VERTCAL INTEGRA-
TION IN MARIETING 99 (1952).
27 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 64 Stat 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1964). "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no
corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation
engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of
the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
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would result in only about one per cent of the total retailers being
foreclosed from the other manufacturers, it nevertheless prohibited
the merger after investigating the entire industry and finding a
general trend toward vertical integration by merger.2s  Thus,
the Court had used the qualitative test to determine how sub-
stantially a vertical merger could affect competition.
Since section 7 is concerned with mergers and acquisitions
rather than contractual arrangements, the Commission's use, in
the instant case, of the Merger Case and its standard of illegality
to determine section 3 illegality in a franchise case seemed strange.
However, the Commission indicated that it found no substantial
distinction between the effect on competition of a vertical merger
and the franchise method of acquiring vertical integration. The
fact that a merger was permanent while a contract could be
abandoned at will by the franchisee was considered unimportant.
The significant fact, according to the Commission, was that the
manufacturer controlled the dealer, and that this control, even
though it could be ended, tended to adversely affect competition.
In actuality, since none of the franchised dealers had indicated
dissatisfaction with the agreements, the effect of the contracts
was integration quite similar to a merger. The increase in
membership indicated that the effect of Brown's plan was a
lessening of competition by a decrease in the number of retailers
able to carry other manufacturers' shoes. Thus, in effect, by
making use of the Merger Case, the Commission indicated its
intention to adhere, once again, to the qualitative approach in
attacking contractual tying arrangements under section 5.
In contesting the Commission's initial cease and desist order,
Brown had advocated a quantitative approach to its franchise
program, arguing that the agreements could only be declared
illegal upon a finding that the program had a substantial anti-
competitive impact upon the nationwide shoe market. Since the
shoes sold by Brown constituted less than one per cent of
national shoe sales, and since only a small number of the total
stores classified as retail shoe stores were involved, 29 Brown
contended that the franchise plan involved control over an un-
substantial part of the nationwide market. The Commission, in
rejecting this approach, returned to its findings in the Merger
Case to examine the effect of Brown's conduct under the franchise
program. Evidence indicated that the shoe industry was a top-
heavy one in which the five largest manufacturers produced twenty-
four per cent of the total output of shoes. Of approximately
one thousand shoe manufacturers in the country, Brown ranked
2 8 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 345 (1962).
29 Brown Shoe Co., supra note 24, at 21,144.
[ VOL.. 41
RECENT DECISIONS
second in dollar volume and third in shoe production. During
the thirty-year existence of the Brown franchise program there
had been a definite increase in the number of members. Testimony
indicated that it had become progressively more difficult for smaller
manufacturers to find retail outlets since most of the retailers
were involved in franchise plans maintained by Brown and the
other large manufacturers. These factors, coupled with a "trend
in the shoe industry generally and on the part of the respondent
[Brown] in particular to vertical integration . . . ," 31 indicated
a clearly deteriorating competitive situation requiring Commission
action.
The court of appeals rejected the Commission's holding, re-
fusing to look upon the franchise program as a tying agreement
such as that found to be anti-competitive by the Supreme Court
in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States.3 2  In that case, the
railroad had a monopoly of the land along its routes and tied the
sale or lease of this land to the use of its hauling services.
This was accomplished by means of clauses in the contracts of
sale and leases which compelled the buyer or lessee to ship over
Northern Pacific lines all commodities produced or manufactured
on the land. The Supreme Court, while holding that there was
an anti-competitive tying arrangement, nevertheless, limited its
decision by stating that
where the seller has no control or dominance over the tying product...
so that it does not represent an effectual weapon to pressure buyers into
taking the tied item . . . any restraint of trade attributable to such
tying arrangements would obviously be insignificant at most.33
Brown, however, had no such monopoly in the services offered (the
tying item) since similar services were offered by other manu-
facturers under their own franchise programs. Thus, these
services offered no "effectual weapon" to force Brown shoes (the
tied item) on the retailers. In effect, the court of appeals was
applying the quantitative test of illegality-the "quantity" of the
market required for illegality being a monopoly in the tying
item.
In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court in-
vestigated the record and noted that no rejection was made of the
Commission's findings as to the effect of the franchise program
on competition. It further indicated that, based upon earlier
Supreme Court cases, it was well established that
30 Id. at 21,145 n.36.31 Id. at 21,146.
32356 U.S. 1 (1958).
33Brown Shoe Co. v. FTC, 339 F2d 45, 54 (8th Cir. 1964).
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the Commission has broad powers to declare trade practices unfair.
This broad power of the Commission is particularly well established
with regard to trade practices which conflict with the basic policies
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts even though such practices may not
actually violate these laws.
34
The Court went on to state that the record dearly indicated
a program which, if enforced (as it had been), would tend to
impede retailers' dealings with Brown's competitors. Finally, the
Court stated that since the Commission had acted under Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, rather than under Section
3 of the Clayton Act, proof that the conduct might substantially
lessen competition was not needed to prove an "unfair method of
competition." -5
This decision appears to have a twofold effect on the treatment
of tying arrangements by the Federal Trade Commission. First,
it now seems clear that the Commission's claimed ability to act
under section 5, upon a smaller quantum of proof of a lessening
of competition than is required under section 3 proceedings, has
the support of the Court. The Court made clear that it rejected
Brown's contention that the Commission could not act without
direct proof that competition would be lessened. It has become
clear that the Federal Trade Commission Act is a separate and
distinct antitrust law with its own requirements. The second
result of the decision involves the standard of illegality to be
used in attacking tying arrangements. The Court's position seems
to indicate agreement with the qualitative test utilized by the
Commission. As a result of this implicit approval of the qualitative
standard for determining the anti-competitive effect of tying arrange-
ments, the Supreme Court and the Commission, for the first time,
are making use of a common test of illegality.
The Court's acceptance of the qualitative test creates pitfalls
for the antitrust counselor. He would much prefer a quantitative
test so that he could more easily determine the limits of control
which a manufacturer may maintain over a retailer and still remain
beyond the scope of the antitrust laws. Faced, however, with a
qualitative standard, his ability to define a violation is greatly
diminished. The percentage of competition eliminated is not
necessarily determinative. Even an infinitesimal percentage of a
market cornered by a manufacturer could be deemed a violation
after the fact-finders have investigated the economic and historical
background of the particular industry. Although this power to
define a section 5 violation is broad, judicial review should provide
a sufficient safeguard against the danger of abuse by an overzealous
Commission.36
34 FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320-21 (1966).
35 Id. at 322.
31 See Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
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It seems clear that the new flexibility given the Federal
Trade Commission by this decision is desirable. No longer need
the Commission wait until the standards of illegality demanded
by Section 3 of the Clayton Act are met in order to attack a
particular trade practice. Instead, the Commission can now act
in the manner originally intended and bring to a halt any unfair
method of competition at the first hint of a potential lessening
of competition.37  However, this power is apparently limited by
the condition that the practice attacked must resemble a Clayton
Act violation, even though it is not specifically within the purview
of that act.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS-
CONTEMPT CONVICTION HELD VoID WHERE SUBCOMMITTEE IN-
QUIRY IS NEITHER SPECIFIED NOR AUTHORIZED BY PARENT COM-
MITTEE. - Petitioner, while testifying before a Subcommittee of the
House Un-American Activities Committee, refused to answer ques-
tions concerning his alleged Communist affiliations. He chose not
to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, but instead chal-
lenged the jurisdiction of the Committee and its Subcommittee, the
authorization of each, and the constitutionality of the inquiry in
general. The petitioner was convicted of contempt of Congress.
This conviction was unanimously reversed by the United States
Supreme Court which held that petitioner was not in contempt
since the subject matter of the inquiry was never specified by the
Committee, as required by its own rules, nor was there a lawful
delegation of authority to the Subcommittee to conduct the in-
vestigation. Goiack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702 (1966).
The power of Congress to punish witnesses for contempt
is derived by implication from its constitutional power to punish
the contumacious behavior of its own members.: The purpose of
this power is the self-protection of the legislative forum and the
furtherance of its lawmaking functions.2 Also, inherent in the
congressional power to formulate laws is the power to investigate. 3
If legislation is to be sound it must be the product of a well-
informed legislature, and undoubtedly one of the best methods
of obtaining information is to conduct fact-finding hearings and
37 S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914).
1 Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 204, 225 (1821). "Each
House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members
for Disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel
a Member." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5.
2 Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of
Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REv. 153, 158-60 (1926).
3 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 160, (1927).
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